Abstract. A deniable cryptosystem allows a sender and a receiver to communicate over an insecure channel in such a way that the communication is still secure even if the adversary can threaten the parties into revealing their internal states after the execution of the protocol. This is done by allowing the parties to change their internal state to make it look like a given ciphertext decrypts to a message dierent from what it really decrypts to. Deniable encryption was in this way introduced to allow to deny a message exchange and hence combat coercion.
Introduction
Alice and Bob live in a country ruled by an evil dictator, Eve. If Alice wants to communicate with Bob, standard public-key cryptography can be used by Alice if she wants to keep Eve from learning the subject of her communication with Bob. However, if Eve controls the network she will be able to observe that a ciphertext is traveling from Alice to Bob. Once the evil Eve knows that a conversation took place, she might get suspicious and force Bob to reveal the content of the conversation. Can cryptography oer any help to Alice and Bob against such a powerful adversary? To solve this problem Canetti, Dwork, Naor and
Ostrovsky [CDNO97] introduced the notion of deniable encryption as a tool to combat coercion.
Using a deniable cryptosystem Alice and Bob can communicate over an insecure channel in a way such that even if Eve records the transcript of the communication and later coerces Alice (resp. Bob, or both)
to reveal their internal state (secret keys, randomness, . . . ), then Alice (resp. Bob, or both) has an ecient strategy to produce an alternative internal state that is consistent with the transcript and with a message dierent than the original one.
Threat model: First note that deniable encryption does not help if Eve has physical access to Alice and Bob's computers. In this case nothing can prevent Eve from seeing everything that Bob sees and therefore learn the encrypted messagesince we want Alice and Bob to actually communicate information between them, this is unavoidable. On the other hand, if Alice and Bob can erase their secret information, they could simply lie about the content of a ciphertext: the standard indistinguishability security requirement implies that Eve cannot check whether the ciphertext is really an encryption of the message that Alice and Bob claim it to be.
Therefore, as in [CDNO97] , we consider the case where the parties hand their private keys and randomness Sender/Receiver/Bi-Deniability: We distinguish between three kinds of deniability, according to which parties can be coerced by Eve. Note that, up to the number of rounds required by the protocol, sender and receiver deniability are equivalent: Bob can use a sender-deniable scheme to send a random key K to Alice, who can use it to encrypt the message M using a one-time pad and send back C = M ⊕ K. Now if Bob is coerced he can claim to have received a dierent message M by using the sender-deniable property and explain the transcript as if it contained a dierent K .
When we consider bi-deniability, the case where Eve can coerce both Alice and Bob, the only coordination that we allow between Alice and Bob is to agree on which message to fake the ciphertext to. In particular this means that the parties cannot communicate to each other their internal states, when they have to produce a fake explanation. This seems to be the only meaningful denition: if Alice and Bob could communicate this information through a channel not controlled by Eve, why would they not use this channel to communicate the original message in the rst place?
Fully-Deniable vs. Multi-Distributional: In a multi-distributional deniable cryptosystem a ciphertext produced with a fake encryption algorithm E F can be later explained as an encryption of any message under the standard encryption algorithm E. In other words, for any m, m it is possible to nd appropriate randomness for E, E F such that E(m ) = E F (m). Note however, that Eve might not believe that the ciphertext was produced using E and ask to see the internal state for E F and in this case the parties have no ecient strategy to lie about the content of the ciphertext. A fully-deniable scheme is a scheme where E = E F and therefore does not present this issue.
Public-key vs. Interactive Cryptosystems: A (receiver/sender/bi)-deniable public-key cryptosystem is a public-key cryptosystem that is (receiver/sender/bi)-deniable. I.e., the cryptosystem consist of a public key known by the sender and the communication protocol consists of sending a ciphertext to the receiver. A generic, or interactive, cryptosystem might involve arbitrary interaction.
Security Level: All notions of deniability can be quantied by ε : N → R + which measures how indistinguishable the faked states are from the honest states. As an example, an ε-receiver-deniable public-key cryptosystem is one in which the faked secret key is ε-indistinguishable from the honest secret key to a computationally bounded distinguisher. We will distinguish between schemes where ε is a negligible function and where ε is of the form 1/p, for some polynomial p. We will idiosyncratically say that the former kind has negligible security and the latter polynomial security.
Prior Work, Our Contributions and Open Questions: Deniable encryption was rst introduced and dened in [CDNO97] . They constructed a sender-deniable public-key cryptosystem with polynomial security, and therefore a receiver-deniable interactive cryptosystem. In [OPW11] O'Neill, Peikert and Waters showed how to construct multi-distributional bi-deniable public-key encryption with negligible security. This is the rst scheme that achieves any kind of deniability when both parties are corrupted. Recently, Dürmuth and Freeman announced a fully-deniable (receiver/sender)-deniable interactive cryptosystem with negligible security [DF11] . However their result was later showed to be incorrect by Peikert and Waters.
Our contribution to the state of the art on deniable-encryption is to derive upper and lower bounds on how secure a deniable public-key encryption scheme can be as a function of the key-size.
Lower bounds: As for lower bounds, we have the following results. Receiver: We show that any public-key cryptosystem with σ-bit keys can be at most 1 2 (σ + 1)
Sender: We do not know of a non-trivial lower bound for sender-deniable public-key encryption.
Bi: Since bi-deniable public-key encryption with σ-bit keys implies receiver-deniable public-key encryption with σ-bit keys, any public-key cryptosystem with σ-bit keys can be at most
Upper bounds: We show three upper bounds. Receiver: If we let κ denote the length of the secret key of the best multi-distributional receiver-deniable public-key encryption scheme, then there exists a 1/n-receiver-deniable public-key encryption scheme with key length σ = O(n 2 κ).
Sender: If we let κ denote the length of the sender randomness in the best multi-distributional senderdeniable public-key encryption scheme, then there exists a 1/n-sender-deniable public-key encryption scheme where the sender randomness has length σ = O(nκ).
Bi: If we let κ denote the length of the secret key of the best multi-distributional bi-deniable public-key encryption scheme, then there exists a 1/n-bi-deniable public-key encryption scheme with key length σ = O(n 4 κ).
We phrase the upper bounds in terms of the upper bounds for multi-distributional schemes. The reason for this is that we do not know of any assumption which allows to construct deniable public-key encryption with polynomial security, which does not also allow to construct multi-distributional deniable encryption. And, we do not know of any direct construction of deniable public-key encryption with polynomial security which is more ecient than going via a multi-distributional scheme. It therefore seems that multi-distributional schemes are the natural building block for deniable public-key encryption with polynomial security.
Our upper bounds for receiver-deniability and sender-deniability are similar to bounds which can be derived from constructions in [OPW11] . Our upper bound for bi-deniability is new. In [OPW11] a construction of a bi-deniable public-key encryption scheme is hinted, but no explicit construction is given which makes it impossible to estimate the complexity. The hinted construction is, however, dierent from the one we give here.
Our lower bound for receiver-deniability is a generalization of a result in [CDNO97] , where a similar bound was proven for any so-called separable public-key encryption scheme. An encryption scheme being separable is, however, a very strong structural requirement, so it was unclear if the bound in [CDNO97] should hold for any scheme. In fact, we have not been able to nd even a conjecture in the more than a decade of literature between [CDNO97] and the present result that polynomial security should be optimal in general. Our proof technique is completely dierent from the one in [CDNO97] , as we cannot make any structural assumption about the encryption scheme in question. Our work leaves a number of interesting open problems.
1. Our proof of the upper bounds are via black-box constructions of deniable public-key encryption with polynomial security from multi-distributional deniable public-key encryption. This shows that multidistributional deniable public-key encryption is stronger than deniable public-key encryption with polynomial security. Is it strictly stronger, or does there exist a black-box construction of multi-distributional deniable public-key encryption from deniable public-key encryption with polynomial security? 2. Our lower bounds do not apply to sender-deniable public-key encryption. Is it possible to construct sender-deniable public-key encryption with better than polynomial security? 3. Our lower bounds do not apply to interactive encryption schemes. Is it possible to construct deniable encryption schemes with better than polynomial security when arbitrary interaction is allowed?
4. There is a gap between our upper and lower bounds of at least a factor κ. Since κ itself is typically, for practical purposes, a rather large number (multi-distributional schemes are not simple objects on themselves), this gap is important in practice. What are the tight bounds on the security of a deniable public-key encryption scheme? We conjecture that the bound is in the order of σ −1 .
Non-committing encryption: Canetti, Feige, Goldreich and Naor introduced the notion of a non-committing cryptosystem, which is similar to the notion of a bi-deniable cryptosystem, but it is only required that the faking can be done by a simulator. This simulator is allowed to use public keys with a dierent distribution than those in the protocol. This is needed when showing adaptive security in simulation-based models.
It is known [CFGN96] how to implement non-committing encryption with negligible security. Several improvements over the original scheme (both in terms of eciency and assumptions) have been published
In [Nie02] it was shown that non-interactive non-committing encryption is impossible. This does not imply the negative result we are proving here, as receiver-deniable public-key encryption does not imply non-committing encryption. In non-committing encryption both sides have to be faked. In receiver-deniable encryption, only the receiver has to be faked. In this sense non-committing encryption is a stronger notion than receiver-deniable encryption. But, in fact, the notions are incomparable, as receiver-deniable encryption on other axes is stronger than non-committing encryption. As an example, it can be shown that if a public-key encryption scheme is receiver-deniable, then the parallel composition of the scheme where the same public key is used to encrypt many massages is also receiver-deniable. This is a property which non-committing encryption provably does not have. And, in fact, this self composition property is crucial in the proof of our lower bound. Also, the result in [Nie02] addresses the case of perfect non-committing encryption (the realworld and the simulated world must be indistinguishable). We are interested in the exact level of security which can be obtained i.e., given a public-key encryption scheme with a certain secret-key length, how deniable can the scheme be?
Structure: In Section 2 we formally dene the dierent avors of deniable public-key encryption. In Section 3
we show that receiver-deniability is maintained under parallel self-composition with at most a linear security loss. We use that fact to derive our lower bounds giving us the impossibility result of fully-receiver deniable encryption. Finally, section 4 contains our results on poly-deniable encryption schemes.
Deniable Public-Key Encryption
In this section we dene three dierent notions of deniable public-key encryption schemes. These notions correspond respectively to an adversary with the ability to coerce the receiver, the sender or both parties simultaneously. We model coercion by letting the adversary request the secret information used in the encryption scheme by the coerceable parties. Deniability is obtained by letting the coerceable parties supply fake secret information.
Basic Scheme. All schemes are dened based on the following denition of a standard public-key encryption scheme consisting of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (G, E, D):
generates a key-pair (pk, sk), where pk is the public key, sk is the secret key and κ is the security parameter. Note that we consider sk to be the randomness used in G(1 κ ).
E pk (m; r) generates a ciphertext c which is an encryption under the public key pk of message m ∈ {0, 1} using randomness r. We sometimes write E pk (m) to make the randomness be implicit.
D sk (c) outputs the message m ∈ {0, 1} contained in the ciphertext c.
Let negl : N → R + be a negligible function. For all notions dened below we require correctness, i.e., we require that Pr[D sk (E pk (m)) = m] > 1 − negl(κ), and IND-CPA security i.e., we require that ∀ PPT (A 1 , A 2 ), ∃ negl(·):
Multi-distributional Encryption. We dene a general form of deniable public-key encryption called multi-distributional deniable public-key encryption. Such a scheme essentially consists of two standard publickey schemes sharing a common decryption algorithm.
The honest scheme (G, E, D) does not provide deniability in itself. The fakeable scheme (G F , E F , D) provides deniability in the sense that, for a ciphertext c fake secret information can be generated. The faked secret information will make c appear as an encryption of any chosen message m in the honest scheme. How this is done depends on the notion of deniability as dened below.
For a multi-distributional deniable public-key encryption scheme to be correct we require standard correctness of all public-key schemes (G , E , D) where G ∈ {G, G F } and E ∈ {E, E F }.
The idea behind having two dierent schemes is to use the fakeable scheme to encrypt a message m on which the parties would like to have deniability. When coerced the parties simply claim that they used the honest scheme to encrypt the fake message m . This approach has two disadvantages. First, the parties must decide beforehand whether they later want to deny. Secondly, is the question of why a coercer should believe the parties, when they claim to have used the honest scheme. Note that we cannot guarantee deniability, if the coercer insists on getting the secret information used in the faking process.
Fully-deniable Encryption. An important special case of multi-distributional deniable public-key encryption is fully-deniable public-key encryption (or just deniable public-key encryption). This notion addresses the disadvantages of multi-distributional encryption mentioned above. For a fully-deniable public-key encryption
, that is there are no special faking key generation and encryption algorithms. We will often omit the prex`fully' for simplicity.
Receiver-Deniability. A multi-distributional receiver-deniable public-key encryption scheme consists of ve
is the fakeable scheme. Notice that the honest and fakeable encryption algorithm are the same since faking is only done on the receiver's side. The faking algorithm F R is dened as follows:
Sender-Deniability. A multi-distributional sender-deniable public-key encryption scheme consists of ve probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (G, E, E F , D, F S ). Here (G, E, D) is the honest scheme and (G, E F , D) is the fakeable scheme. The faking algorithm F S is dened as follows:
F S (pk, m, r, m ) generates alternative randomness r such that E Fpk (m; r) = E pk (m ; r ).
Bi-Deniability. We assume here to be in a setting where receiver and sender have individual faking algorithms. This models the fact that, after an initial stage where the parties can agree on which message to fake to, the sender and the receiver cannot communicate over a channel that is not controlled by the adversaryotherwise they could be using this channel to communicate the message m in the rst place.
A multi-distributional bi-deniable public-key encryption scheme consists of seven probabilistic polynomial-
The faking algorithms F R and F S are dened similar to the receiverdeniable and sender-deniable notions respectively, that is:
Security Notions
The security notions of the three schemes above, are dened in terms of the following experiments performed with an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), where m, m ∈ {0, 1} .
Honest Game (Receiver) Faking Game (Receiver)
Let h A (κ) and f A (κ) be the random variables describing b when running the honest game and faking game respectively with security parameter κ. The advantage of A is
We say that a scheme is (receiver/sender/bi)-deniable if Adv A is negligible in κ for any ecient A. Let ε : N → R + . We say that a scheme is ε-(receiver/sender/bi)-deniable if Adv A (κ) ≤ ε(κ) + negl(κ).
Full Bi-Deniablity implies Full Sender/Receiver-Deniability
Any fully bi-deniable scheme can trivially be turned into both a receiver-deniable and a sender-deniable scheme. On the surface this seems obvious, if both parties can fake then they should be able to fake individually as well. Surprisingly, however, this conclusion cannot be drawn in the multi-distributional settingin [OPW11] the authors show that in this setting bi-deniability does imply sender deniability but not receiver deniability. As stated in Lemma 1 similar subtleties do not arise in the fully-deniable case. A proof of this can be found in Appendix A. Lemma 1. If (G, E, D, F R , F S ) is a fully ε-bi-deniable encryption scheme, then (G, E, D, F S ) is a fully ε-senderdeniable encryption scheme and (G, E, D, F R ) is a fully ε-receiver-deniable encryption scheme. In this section we prove the impossibility of fully receiver-deniable and fully bi-deniable public-key encryption with better than inverse polynomial security. Since, by Lemma 1, any fully bi-deniable public-key encryption scheme is also a fully receiver-deniable public-key encryption scheme, it is sucient to prove impossibility of fully receiver-deniable public-key encryption. It turns out that the impossibility follows readily from the fact that full receiver-deniability is preserved under parallel self-composition with only a linear security loss.
We will use a slightly modied denition of receiver-deniability. Recall that in the denition from section 2 the faking algorithm F R is invoked as F R (sk, c, m ), especially it is not given the sender's randomness r. In this section we will allow F R to have access to r, that is F R is invoked as F R (sk, m, r, m ). Since we are proving an impossibility result, this does not weaken the result.
Security of Parallel Self-Composition
Let (G, E, D, F R ) be any receiver-deniable public-key cryptosystem. Let n : N → N be a polynomial in the security parameter κ. We dene the parallel self-composition (G n , E n , D n , F R n ) as follows:
We can then describe the advantage of A n in terms of the advantages of A h for h = 1, . . . , n.
Since, by assumption on (G, E, D, F R ), we have a bound on the advantage of each A h , this gives us the bound on the advantage of A n . The attacker A h runs as follows:
1. A h,1 : Receives pk. , (c 1 , . . . , c n ), sk n ) to A n and run it to obtain a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. When A h is run in the honest game, then sk n is computed from an honest secret key sk h as sk i ← F R (sk i−1 , m i , r i , m i ) for i = h + 1, . . . , n. When A h is run in the faking game, then sk n is computed from an honest secret key sk h−1 as sk i ← F R (sk i−1 , m i , r i , m i ) for i = h, . . . , n, where the rst computation sk h ← F R (sk h−1 , m h , r h , m h ) is performed by the faking game before sk h is input to A h . It follows that when A h is run in the honest game and A h+1 is run in the faking game, the values input to A n have identical
We then have by denition Adv A h (κ) = |b Notice that Lemma 2 means that a faked secret key sk n , resulting from F R n , must somehow remember the faking of each ciphertext involved in the process. In other words sk n must not only fake a single ciphertext, it must ensure that every ciphertext c i decrypts to the faked message m i with high probability. To see why consider the ecient adversary A of the receiver-deniable game against (G n , E n , D n , F R n ) that simply outputs b = 1 if m i = D sk (c i ) for all i = 1, . . . , n and b = 0 otherwise. By correctness of the encryption scheme and by Lemma 2 the above property of sk n becomes clear.
Let s be a bit string of length n. In the proof of the following theorem we use this property to show how to associate each bit of s with a faking of a ciphertext and thus how to store s in the memory of the faked secret key sk n . The impossibility result arises from the fact that this can be done even for random s longer than sk n .
Lower Bound
We here show a lower bound on ε in an ε-receiver-deniable encryption scheme. This bound immediately
gives that one cannot obtain better than polynomial security. The bound is stated formally in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Let (G, E, D, F R ) be ε-receiver deniable, and let σ be an upper bound on the length of the secret keys of (G, E, D, F R ), including the faked ones.
Proof. We reach our bound via impossibility of compressing uniformly random data. Let n = σ + 1. We
Consider the following communication protocol parametrized by κ. Here is how the sender works:
2. Sample uniformly random m ← {0, 1} n and let m = 0 n .
Sample c ← E
n pk (m; r). 4. Let sk ← F R n (sk, m, r, m ).
Send (c, sk ).
On receiving (c, sk ) the receiver outputs m = D n sk (c). To bound the probability that this protocol fails i.e., that m = m , consider the following adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) for the receiver-deniable security games against (G n , E n , D n , F R n ). On input pk A 1 outputs (m, m , st), where the messages m and m are sampled as in step 2 of the sender algorithm above. The state st is set to be m . On input (st, c, sk ) A 2 computes D n sk (c) = m and outputs 1 if m = m = st and 0 otherwise. Now notice that steps 1-4 of the sender algorithm above correspond to the rst four steps of the receiver-deniable faking game against A. That is the probability that the communication protocol fails i.e., that m = m , is exactly the same as A 2 outputting 0 in the faking game. In the honest game we have by correctness of (G n , E n , D n , F R n ) that A 2 only outputs 0 with negligible probability. Thus by nε-receiver deniability we have Pr [m = m ] ≤ nε(κ) + negl(κ). We later use this bound on the correctness of the communication protocol to derive our bound, but rst we transform the protocol a bit.
For each κ, let r κ be the value which minimizes the probability that m = m when c κ = E pk (0 n ; r κ ).
Consider then the following non-uniform communication protocol parametrized by κ. Here is how the sender works:
1. Sample (pk, sk) ← G(1 κ ).
Sample m ← {0, 1}
n .
3. Let sk ← F R (sk, 0 n , r κ , m ). is at most σ bits long and because m is uniformly random and n = σ + 1 bits long. Combining these bounds we get that ε(κ) ≥ 1 2 (σ + 1) −1 − negl(κ).
In words, this bound says that any public-key cryptosystem with σ-bit keys can be be at most 1 2 (σ +1)
−1 -receiver-deniable. Thus to get negligible receiver-deniability keys must be superpolynomial in size. This however would contradict the key generation algorithm being polynomial-time as required by our denition of a public-key cryptosystem.
From Multi-Distributional To Poly Deniability
We now give explicit constructions of poly-(sender/receiver/bi)-deniable public-key encryption schemes from any multi-distributional (sender/reciever/bi)-deniable public-key encryption scheme respectively. As in [CDNO97, OPW11] , the basic idea in all these constructions is to encrypt a message bit b by rst writing it as b = n i=1 b i for random b i 's, and then encrypting each b i independently using randomly either the honest or the fakeable encryption scheme. To fake we just have to identify an index j where the fakeable scheme was used and use the corresponding faking algorithm. This is no problem for sender and receiver deniablility since in those cases whoever is running the faking algorithm knows exactly on which indices the fakeable scheme was used. The bi-deniable case however is more challenging because sender and receiver must agree on an index j where they both used the fakeable scheme. As discussed in the introduction, a dierent solution for this problem was hinted in [OPW11] . All the constructions are for bit encryption: for longer plaintext space one can simply run the scheme in parallel.
In the following subsections we will need two technical lemmas which we state here. Let a randomized encoding E be a randomized function from {0, 1} to {0, 1} n . Consider the following game (A, E) between a randomized encoding E and an adversary A (an interactive Turing machine):
1. Run A to make it output a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. 
The rst lemma is trivial to prove, and the second follows directly from the Berry-Esseen inequality [KS10] .
Full proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Poly-Sender-Deniability
As a warm up we show that a multi-distributional sender-deniable scheme implies a poly-sender-deniable scheme. From a scheme (G, E, E F , D, F S ) we produce a scheme (G , E , D , F S ) which encrypts a single bit b.
The produced scheme is basically the Parity Scheme of [CDNO97] only whereas our scheme is based on a multi-distributional sender-deniable scheme, the scheme in [CDNO97] is based on a so-called translucent set.
Encryption E pk (b): Sample a uniformly random index j ∈ {0, . . . , n} so that j is even for b = 0 and odd for b = 1. For i = 1, . . . n do the following.
Proof. Correctness and semantic security is obvious. To prove poly-sender-deniability we rst consider the following hybrid game H 1 .
H 1 proceeds exactly as the faking game for sender-deniability only it modies the faking algorithm F S by simply sampling r j as randomness for the honest encryption algorithm E, and replaces the ciphertext C = (c i )
where c j = E pk (0; r j ) and c i = c i for all i = j. Notice that the H 1 only changes the distribution of r j and c j , the distribution of all other inputs to the adversary remains the same. In other words distinguishing the two games comes down to distinguishing an honest encryption of 0 from an encryption faked to an honest encryption of 0. Thus by the multi-distributional sender-deniability of (G, E, E F , D, F S ) the advantage of any adversary in distinguishing the two games will be negligible in κ. Now consider another hybrid game H 2 . H 2 proceeds exactly as the honest game for sender-deniability except that it modies the encryption algorithm E by picking j in the following way: rst it picks a uniformly random index i ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that i is odd for b = 0 and even for b = 1 (i.e., the opposite of how E picks j) and then sets j = i − 1. Notice now that H 2 outputs exactly the same as H 1 to the adversary only the output is generated in a slightly dierent order. I.e., H 1 and H 2 are perfectly indistinguishable. However since H 2 proceeds exactly as the honest game, except that it picks j from a dierent distribution, distinguishing H 2 from the honest game comes down to distinguishing the two dierent distributions of j.
In order to utilize Lemma 3 we can view these distributions as randomized encodings. Let us denote by E 0 and E 1 the encodings that encodes a bit b as j 1's followed by n − j 0's. For E 0 j is sampled as in the honest game where the adversary outputs b and for E 1 j is sampled as in the hybrid game H 2 where the adversary outputs b. If j = −1 in the hybrid game E 1 will encode this as a special string, say a 0 followed by n − 1 1's. First notice that for b = 0 both games sample j uniformly random in {0, 2, 4, . . . , n − 1}, i.e., σ 0 = 0. However for b = 1 the honest game samples j uniformly random in {1, 3, 5, . . . , n} whereas H 2 samples uniformly random in {−1, 1, 3, . . . , n − 2}. Thus clearly σ 1 = 4/n. Now by Lemma 3 we have that any adversary has advantage at most 4/n in distinguishing the honest game from H 2 . By the above hybrid argument it follows that any adversary has advantage at most 4/n + negl(κ) in distinguishing the honest game from the faking game. I.e., (G, E, E F , D, F S ) is 4/n-deniable.
Poly-Receiver-Deniability
We show that a multi-distributional receiver-deniable scheme implies a poly-receiver-deniable scheme. From a scheme (G, G F , E, D, F R ) we produce a scheme (G , E , D , F R ) which encrypts a single bit b.
Key generation G (1 κ ): For i = 1, . . . , n sample uniformly random bits a i ∈ {0, 1} and then sample
. . , n − 1, sample b i uniformly at random and let
. Pick a uniformly random index i for which a i = 1, compute b i = D ski (c i ) and let sk i = F R (sk i , c i , 1 − b i ) and a i = 0. For all j = i, let sk j = sk j and a j = a j . Output SK = (sk j , a j ) n j=1 .
If κ is they key length of the underlying scheme then the above scheme has keys of length nκ. The following result then implies that one can build a 1/n-receiver deniable scheme with keys of size σ = O(n 2 κ).
Proof. In the following we assume for simplicity that n is odd, a similar analysis can be made in the case of n even. Correctness and semantic security is obvious. Using a hybrid argument, the distinguishing probability of any poly-time adversary against the above scheme is negligible close to the best distinguishing advantage between the two randomized encoding E 0 and E 1 dened as follows:
where the b i ∈ {0, 1} are uniformly random and independent except that b = 
, and it follows that
The last equality follows from n being odd. Consider then Lemma 4, with p = q = 1 2
and N s = s − 1. The variable X s in the premise then has exactly the same distribution as
and N s = n−1 into Lemma 4 we get that Pr [
Poly-Bi-Deniability
We show that a multi-distributional bi-deniable scheme implies a poly-bi-deniable scheme. From a scheme 
and 
Proof. Correctness follows by observing that b i = b i unless one of the uniformly random κ-bit messages m i happens to be 0 κ , which is a negligible event. Semantic security is obvious. As for bi-deniability, by a hybrid argument similar to that in the proofs of Thm. 2 and Thm. 3, distinguishing the honest and faking game comes down to distinguishing the following two random encodings of a bit b.
1. E 0 (b) = (b 1 , . . . , b n 2 , a 1 , . . . , a n 2 ), where the b i ∈ {0, 1} are sampled uniformly at random except that
. Otherwise, pick a uniformly random k ∈ {1, . . . , n 2 } for which b k = 1 and then let b k = 0 and let
It happens that a k = 0 with probability 1/n, so by adding 1/n to the bound in the end, we can analyse under the assumption that a k = 1. In that case we can describe E 1 (b) as above, except that we pick k uniformly at random among the i's for which b i = 1 and a i = 1. Then we set b k = 0 and a k = 0 and set b i =k = b i and a i =k = a i .
Given a vector v = (b 1 , . . . , b n 2 , a 1 , . . . , a n 2 ), we let # 00 (v) be the number of i's for which b i = a i = 0 and we let # 11 (v) be the number of i's for which b i = a i = 1. For simplicity we assume that b is uniformly random, such that b 1 , . . . , b n 2 is uniform in {0, 1} The theorem then follows from
6. B 2 : Output b.
In the above B is simply forwarding all its inputs to A except for the secret key which is simply ignored. Therefore the advantage of B will be exactly the same as the advantage for A. Since the advantage of A is greater than ε, so is the advantage of B. This is in contradiction to the assumption that (G, E, D, F R , F S ) is ε-bi-deniable.
Receiver-deniability
Now we assume an adversary A breaking the receiver-deniability property, from this we construct an adversary breaking the bi-deniability property. We do exactly as in the sender-deniable case, that is, simply forwarding all inputs and outputs received. The only dierence is that instead of invoking A 2 with r or r we use sk or sk . Once again it should be clear that the distinguishing probabilities are the same.
B
On the probability that a sum of i.i.d.s hits close to the expected value
In this section we derive a parametrized version of the central limit theorem for us in bounding the advantage of our adversaries. We look at a special cases of getting a bound on the probability mass in a small interval close to the expected value.
Lemma 2. Let s = 1, 2, . . . be a parameter. 
